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THE SERMON ON THE MOUNTAIN OF 
CASH: HOW TO CURTAIL THE 
PROSPERITY SCHEME AND PREVENT 
OPPORTUNISTS FROM “PREYING” ON 
VULNERABLE PARISHIONERS 
JACOB M. BASS* 
Abstract: Many televangelists in the United States preach the “prosperity 
gospel,” a doctrine which teaches that a religiously faithful person who con-
tinually donates money to church ministries can expect God to grant material 
improvements to their finances, health, and relationships. Americans who par-
ticipate in prosperity gospel churches often donate thousands of dollars to 
these churches, despite their difficulty financing such large donations and the 
lack of the promised material improvement to their lives. Televangelists who 
preach the prosperity gospel secretly use these donations to finance their ex-
travagant lifestyles, instead of using the funds to support the faithful masses 
who continue to donate. The U.S. Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause makes 
it difficult to regulate this religiously-based scheme. This Note argues that to 
rectify the abuses of prosperity preachers, prosecutors and private individuals 
should work within the framework of existing criminal and tax law to seek 
convictions for fraud and tax evasion.  
INTRODUCTION 
Bonnie Parker spent tens of thousands of dollars trying to treat her 
breast cancer.1 She did not tell her children or family about her diagnosis, 
but opted to keep it to herself.2 Throughout most of her illness, Parker’s 
personal struggles were captured only in her diary, in which she penned, 
“God heal me. God heal me. God heal me.”3 Despite the monetary amount 
                                                                                                                           
 * Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE 2016–2017. 
 1 News 8 Reporting Featured in ‘Last Week Tonight’ Segment, WFAA (Aug. 19, 2015), 
http://www.wfaa.com/story/news/local/2015/08/19/news-8-reporting-featured—last-week-tonight-
televangelists-segment/31999057/ [http://perma.cc/VB6Z-MG7G]; SUFFER THE CHILDREN (Trevor 
Glass 2006), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2X5dpfzXUus [http://perma.cc/5CDX-M472]. 
 2 SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 1. 
 3 Jamie Stengle, Measles Cases Put Texas Megachurch Under Scrutiny, YAHOO! NEWS (Aug. 
31, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/measles-cases-put-texas-megachurch-under-scrutiny-165150724.
html [http://perma.cc/ABV8-X2JC]; see SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 1. 
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she was spending to cure herself, Parker was not getting any better.4 This is 
because Parker was not paying a hospital or a physician for her treatment.5 
Instead, she was sending money to televangelists who preached that “faith” 
was the best medicine for treating diseases.6  
Like many Americans, Parker was an adherent to a Christian religious 
movement known as the “prosperity gospel,” which teaches that donating 
money to a specific church or pastor will lead to God’s blessing of health, 
improved relationships, and financial prosperity.7 These prosperity “church-
es” have services that are frequently broadcast on television stations across 
the country and are easily searchable on the Internet; they enjoy a weekly 
domestic viewership in the millions.8 Parker, one of these viewers, had 
spent countless mornings on her couch watching broadcasts of prosperity 
gospel televangelist Kenneth Copeland and his wife, Gloria Copeland, both 
of whom mesmerized Parker and millions of other Americans with their 
promises of divine health and financial success for those who donated to the 
church.9 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Televangelists: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO Broadcast Aug. 16, 2015) 
[hereinafter Last Week Tonight], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7y1xJAVZxXg [http://perma.
cc/AH8F-5UMM]. 
 5 See id. Parker believed that seeking professional medical treatment was sinful. Stengle, 
supra note 3. 
 6 See Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. Televangelists often repeat the phrase “if you use your 
faith” without elaborating what this means or how to precisely do so. See, e.g., id. The Merriam-
Webster Dictionary defines faith as “belief and trust in and loyalty to God.” Faith, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/faith [http://perma.cc/7DA5-9L3B]. The 
word “faith,” as used by televangelists, represents a belief in and loyalty to God. See Last Week To-
night, supra note 4; SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 1. It also means “faith that repeatedly donat-
ing money will lead to the receipt of money.” See Last Week Tonight, supra note 1. A “televangelist” 
is defined as “a person and especially a preacher who appears on television in order to teach about 
Christianity and try to persuade people to become Christians.” Televangelist, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/televangelist [http://perma.cc/DEP5-UEKQ]. 
 7 Eric Gorski, ‘Gospel of Wealth’ Facing Scrutiny, USA TODAY (Dec. 27, 2007, 2:56 PM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-12-27-64745293_x.htm [http://perma.cc/NRF5-
9TKY]; see Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. The “prosperity gospel” is not its own denomination 
of Christianity but rather is a religious interpretation of the Bible taught in various Christian 
churches. See KATE BOWLER, BLESSED: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PROSPERITY GOSPEL 183, 
256 (2013) (noting that about two-thirds of those who participate in prosperity churches state that 
they are non-denominational, with the remaining third belonging to Pentecostal, Evangelical, 
Methodist, or other denominations). Because of this disparity, this Note—as well as other academ-
ics—use the term “prosperity” for a convenient shorthand to denote the theology. See id. at 128. 
The prosperity gospel has been called “seed-faith”; the idea being that the more “seeds”—
prosperity preachers’ euphemism for financial donations—one sows, the higher the returns. See 
Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. 
 8 See JAMES A. ROBERTS, SHINY OBJECTS: WHY WE SPEND MONEY WE DON’T HAVE IN 
SEARCH OF HAPPINESS WE CAN’T BUY 192 (2011). 
 9 See News 8 Reporting Featured in ‘Last Week Tonight’ Segment, supra note 1. Gloria 
Copeland once said during a sermon: 
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The Copelands’ assertions that “faith healing” and the contribution of 
large amounts of money would cure cancer more effectively than prescribed 
drugs and medical treatment directed Parker to donate tens of thousands of 
dollars out of her personal budget to Copeland Ministries.10 The donations, 
however, did not bring Parker the relief she desperately sought.11 The pho-
tographs of Parker prior to her death that depict a frail, old woman lying in 
bed with a respirator suggest that Parker had softened her reluctance of 
modern medicine—albeit too late.12 Parker’s family members recounted the 
profound disappointment Parker had felt prior to her death in 2004; after 
experiencing no “faith healing” from her previous donations, Parker be-
lieved that she had not spent enough money to cure herself.13 In response to 
her mother’s grief, Kristi Beach sent two unanswered letters to the 
Copelands inquiring about her mother’s donations to their ministry.14 In an 
interview, a representative for the Copelands responded that the Copelands 
do not send response letters to “demits,” a term they use for people they 
consider to be “demented.”15 Despite all of their broadcasts about the pow-
ers of “faith healing,” the Copelands left Parker’s family without explana-
tion for their loss, or a chance to get their money back.16 
                                                                                                                           
We know what’s wrong with you; you’ve got cancer. The bad news is, we don’t 
know what to do about it, except give you some poison that’ll make you sicker [sic]. 
Now which do you want to do? Do you want to do that? Or do you want to sit here 
on a Saturday morning, hear the word of God, and let faith come into your heart and 
be healed. 
Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. Note that although “promise” is a term of art in contract law, it is 
used in the colloquial sense throughout this Note. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or re-
frain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a 
commitment has been made.”). 
 10 See Last Week Tonight, supra note 4; News 8 Reporting Featured in ‘Last Week Tonight’ 
Segment, supra note 1. “Faith healing” ranges from the belief that prayer aids in recovery to the posi-
tion that faith, rather than medical science, is what cures people of their afflictions. See BOWLER, 
supra note 7, at 161. An advertisement for God’s Prescription for Divine Health, one of Gloria 
Copeland’s numerous books on faith healing, promises that “[t]here is a medicine so powerful it can 
cure every sickness and disease known to man. . . . Sound too good to be true? It’s not! Gloria proves 
by the word of and confirms by personal experience that such supernatural medicine exists.” God’s 
Prescription for Divine Health: Product Description, KENNETH COPELAND MINISTRIES, https://
my.kcm.org/p-317-gods-prescription-for-divine-health.aspx [https://perma.cc/SK8Q-TV3Y]. Despite 
the Copelands’ claims about the power of faith healing, Kenneth Copeland’s son said that his father 
goes to the doctor. SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 1. 
 11 See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 1. 
 12 See id. 
 13 See id.  
 14 Id.  
 15 Id. 
 16 See id. 
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Parker’s story is not unique.17 She is one of roughly sixteen million 
Americans who donate to, and follow the teachings of the prosperity gospel 
with the hopes of being repaid spiritually and financially.18 In recent years, 
the doctrine has seen an increase in followers, particularly from individuals 
with low- and middle-income backgrounds.19 The promises these churches 
extol are particularly alluring because these low- and middle-income adher-
ents view the scheme as a quick way to riches.20 As one commentator stated: 
“[T]he appeal of prosperity theology is obvious. The faith movement sells a 
compelling bill of goods: God, wealth, and a healthy body to enjoy it.”21 
Moreover, followers are taught this belief by wealthy televangelists who hold 
out their successes as proof that following the prosperity gospel can be in-
credibly fruitful.22 Unbeknownst to most followers, these pastors did not gain 
wealth by reaping the purported benefits of the prosperity gospel; instead, 
they made their millions by retaining their followers’ donations and masking 
those donations as proof that “faith” can make a person richer.23 
The prosperity gospel and its preachers have been criticized by numer-
ous secular and religious commentators for using God and faith to financially 
exploit impoverished adherents.24 The lifecycle of a prosperity gospel dona-
                                                                                                                           
 17 See DAVID WAYNE JONES & RUSSELL S. WOODBRIDGE, HEALTH, WEALTH & HAPPINESS: 
HAS THE PROSPERITY GOSPEL OVERSHADOWED THE GOSPEL OF CHRIST? 13 (2011). 
 18 Bradley A. Koch, Who Are the Prosperity Gospel Adherents?, 36 J. IDEOLOGY 1, 2–3 
(2014); see Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. This figure was estimated from the year 2006; at the 
time, approximately five percent of all Americans were members of the prosperity movement. 
Koch, supra, at 21. Prosperity preachers typically vary the specific relationship between donation 
and reward, but they generally proclaim that consistent donation will allow the follower to live the 
same extravagant lifestyle the preachers have. See BOWLER, supra note 7, at 134–35. 
 19 See Gorski, supra note 7. But see BOWLER, supra note 7, at 233 (noting it is difficult to 
correctly gauge precise statistics regarding the wealth of the followers of the prosperity gospel and 
the number of those followers). Scholars debate whether the Great Recession of 2008 caused 
prosperity pastors to thrive. Compare ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 185 (noting that prosperity theol-
ogy was being taught at more churches during the 2008 recession and that the recession was pos-
sibly even fueling the movement), with BOWLER, supra note 7, at 214–16 (stating that pastors 
changed their fundraising approach during the recession, but that many pastors were financially 
damaged by the recession). 
 20 See JOHNATHAN L. WALTON, WATCH THIS! THE ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF BLACK 
TELEVANGELISM 95 (Peter J. Paris et al. eds., 2009). The movement preaches that Jesus was 
wealthy and that he wishes for believers to be the same. Id. Similarly, adherents believe that pov-
erty and sickness arise because people do not have enough faith. Id. 
 21 BOWLER, supra note 7, at 232. 
 22 See ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 191–93. Although prosperity preachers hold themselves out 
as proof that adherents can become wealthy, they refuse to disclose pastors’ and members’ sala-
ries, as well as their operating budgets. BOWLER, supra note 7, at 233. Thus, it is difficult to de-
termine the true financial condition of prosperity theology as a whole. See id. 
 23 See BOWLER, supra note 7, at 232; ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 191–93; Last Week Tonight, 
supra note 4. 
 24 See Leonardo Blair, Creflo Dollar Will Get $70 Million Gulfstream G650 Jet Says Church; 
World Changers Board Says It Is ‘Necessary’ for Ministry, CHRISTIAN POST (June 2, 2015), 
http://www.christianpost.com/news/creflo-dollar-will-get-70-million-gulfstream-g650-jet-says-
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tion is shrouded in secrecy; few, if any, prosperity churches explain what 
happens to donations made by devout followers after they reach ministerial 
treasuries.25 Despite the pastors’ assertions that the donations are for church 
operations, many commentators suspect that the money is instead routed di-
rectly to the televangelist pastors, considering their opulent lifestyles.26 
Kenneth Copeland, the “godfather” of the prosperity gospel, and one 
of the most well-known televangelists in the nation, has benefitted exten-
sively as a preacher of the prosperity gospel, and is a paradigmatic example 
of how prosperity preachers live and run their ministries.27 Copeland lives 
in a $6 million mansion in Texas.28 He frequently flies around the country 
in a $20 million private jet to enjoy excursions like ski trips in Colorado and 
exotic game hunts in southern Texas.29 Though the lack of transparency in 
prosperity churches makes it difficult to know for sure, many critics of the 
prosperity movement have argued that the Copelands’ immense wealth comes 
largely from donations.30 The danger with the prosperity scheme lies in the 
fact that these pastors portray this wealth to their viewers as being a result 
of the prosperity gospel, and not a result of the millions of dollars in dona-
tions the viewers send in each year—the latter being the more realistic ex-
planation.31 Unsuspecting followers, like Parker, are led to believe that their 
donations are going directly to the church, and that their opportunity to be 
                                                                                                                           
church-world-changers-board-says-it-is-necessary-for-ministry-139858/ [http://perma.cc/6NVR-
ANSL] (noting criticism from early 2015 when pastor Creflo Dollar asked for a $300 donation 
from each of his ministry’s two hundred thousand international parishioners so he could purchase 
a $65 million luxury private jet); see also Gorski, supra note 7 (noting Senate investigation into 
prosperity gospel). Catholic priest Reginald Martin and other religious leaders criticize the pros-
perity gospel because it runs counter to the traditional notion that Jesus lived a simple life and 
commended those who embraced voluntary poverty. Reginald Martin, Prosperity Gospel?, OUR 
SUNDAY VISITOR (Sep. 7, 2015), https://www.osv.com/Article/TabId/493/ArtMID/13569/Article
ID/18119/Prosperity-Gospel.aspx [http://perma.cc/KWN3-EMW7]. 
 25 See BOWLER, supra note 7, at 233; Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. 
 26 See Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. 
 27 ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 191; see Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. Though not the first 
prosperity preacher, Copeland is considered to be a pioneer of the modern prosperity movement, and 
has supporters worldwide. See ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 191; Stengle, supra note 3. 
 28 Last Week Tonight, supra note 4; News 8 Reporting Featured in ‘Last Week Tonight’ Seg-
ment, supra note 1. The mansion sits on a 1500-acre compound and includes a church, a private 
airstrip, and a hangar. Gorski, supra note 7. 
 29 Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. On one particular hunt, Copeland and his son hunted two 
deer native to India and Sri Lanka. Id. Copeland also owns two other planes. Van Biema, Hucka-
bee Stands by a Televangelist, TIME (Nov. 15, 2007), http://content.time.com/time/politics/article/
0,8599,1684330,00.html [https://perma.cc/QG3P-LHPR]. 
 30 See Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. 
 31 See BOWLER, supra note 7, at 232–33; MICHAEL S. HAMILTON, More Money, More Minis-
try: The Financing of American Evangelicalism Since 1945, in MORE MONEY MORE MINISTRY 
104, 115–16 (Larry Eskridge & Mark A. Noll eds., 2000). 
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rewarded by God for their dedication to the prosperity gospel is just around 
the corner.32 
Televangelist ministries, such as the one run by the Copelands, rely on 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 
order to enjoy an almost complete absence of government regulation.33 The 
statements made, and actions taken, by televangelist pastors often go un-
questioned because, under U.S. Supreme Court case law, the government is 
effectively forbidden by the Free Exercise Clause from challenging the va-
lidity of religious beliefs.34 When the government does inquire into the ac-
tions of these ministries, the pastors criticize the government for invading 
upon their religious liberty.35 Furthermore, the funds these pastors receive 
from their viewers often go unreported because these ministries are consid-
ered “churches” under the U.S. Tax Code and are thereby not required to 
disclose their finances.36 Investigations into the financial portfolios of these 
“churches” do not reveal where the parishioner contributions are being allo-
cated, or how much is actually being donated.37 The prosperity scheme, and 
the televangelist pastors who preach it, are successful in exploiting money 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 115; Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. Televangelists’ 
legitimacy is supported in part by their endorsements from notable politicians. Van Biema, supra 
note 29. In 2007, then-presidential candidate Mike Huckabee said the Copelands “are about the 
most gracious, authentic, and humble people I know . . . . They have brought hope to millions 
. . . .” Id. 
 33 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; 2 DAVID M. O’BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: 
CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 800–01 (Dexter Gasque ed., 6th ed. 2005); Last Week To-
night, supra note 4. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment states: “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. I (emphasis added to distinguish Free Exercise Clause from Establishment 
Clause). The Free Exercise Clause has been held to apply to the states by incorporation into the 
Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876–77 (1990). Though the intricacies of the legal privileges and limitations 
of the Free Exercise Clause will be discussed later in this Note, there are salient political disincen-
tives to challenging religious institutions. See Van Biema, supra note 29. 
 34 See United States v. Ballard (Ballard II ) , 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944). 
 35 See Eric Gorski, Analysis: Copeland’s Religious Empire Benefits His Family, USA TODAY 
(July 27, 2008), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/2008-07-27-copeland-evangelist-
finances_N.htm [http://perma.cc/VJL5-APZW] (paraphrasing Copeland Ministries’ view that a 
2007 Senate inquiry into its organization, led by Iowa Senator Grassley, was an attack on the min-
istry’s religious liberty); Van Biema, supra note 29 (mentioning one Evangelist observer’s con-
cern that Senator Grassley’s inquiry was a “saint hunt”). 
 36 See Matthew Encino, Holy Profits: How Federal Law Allows for the Abuse of the Church 
Tax-Exempt Status, 14 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 78, 85–87 (2014). See generally Patrick Sternal, 
The Business of Religion: Current Legal Issues Facing Religious Organizations, 18 BUS. L. TO-
DAY 47 (2009) (providing a useful background on current issues in religious tax law). 
 37 See Laurie Goodstein, Tax-Exempt Ministries Avoid New Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 
2011, at A12, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/us/politics/08churches.html?_r=1 [https://
perma.cc/9ULE-66N8]. 
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from their parishioners because they are able to hide under the guise of reli-
gious liberty.38 
Part I of this Note first addresses the mechanics of the prosperity gos-
pel and how its preachers entice followers to donate money. This section 
also analyzes the demographics of the movement and why those who follow 
it—particularly poor and uneducated Americans—are more inclined to be-
lieve in the gospel. Part II discusses the judicial and legislative history of 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. This section also ad-
dresses the case law leading up to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA) of 1993 and how the Act relates to the prosperity gospel. It then 
addresses how generous tax-reporting loopholes have allowed prosperity 
churches to continue being unregulated. Part III analyzes three possible 
ways to hold prosperity preachers accountable, including a discussion of 
how criminal fraud, tax evasion, and civil fraud should be employed by the 
government or by private individuals. The circumstances surrounding the 
demise of past prosperity pastors are also analyzed as guidance for holding 
today’s prosperity preachers similarly accountable. 
I. FINANCING THE PROSPERITY GOSPEL: HOW TELEVANGELISTS MAKE 
THEIR MONEY AND FROM WHOM THEY TAKE IT 
One of the most salient criticisms of the prosperity gospel is the strik-
ing similarity between the ways in which prosperity churches and corpora-
tions operate.39 A prosperity church’s fundamental message is similar to that 
of a business: investing money in the business (the prosperity church) will 
cause the investor (the parishioner) to gain more money.40 Despite their 
Christian tradition, however, prosperity ministries often do not reinvest 
funds back into the community.41 Instead, the money lines the coffers of 
televangelist preachers who claim to be using the funds for ministerial pur-
poses.42 The prosperity gospel encourages this concentration of wealth at 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See id. 
 39 See BOWLER, supra note 7, at 183, 215 (analyzing the ways in which prosperity churches 
made changes to their revenue models in response to the 2008 recession). Even the physical 
presentations of megachurches resemble a business structure more so than they do traditional 
houses of worship. WALTON, supra note 20, at 96. Pastors of one prosperity gospel denomination, 
the Word of Faith, go so far as to not have traditional Christian symbols, such as crosses or stained 
glass images of Jesus, in the building. Id. These pastors eschew more traditional robes or bright 
colors and dress as if they “belong on the pages of a Brooks Brothers catalog.” Id. 
 40 See Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. 
 41 See WALTON, supra note 20, at 96. 
 42 See Kenneth Copeland Ministries Online Giving, KENNETH COPELAND MINISTRIES, https://
giving.kcm.org/ [http://perma.cc/QNL9-L6SH]; Last Week Tonight, supra note 4; see also ROB-
ERTS, supra note 8, at 192–93 (detailing lifestyles of wealthy televangelists). While prosperity 
preachers do ask for donations for traditional charitable purposes, such as natural disaster relief, 
their emphasis is largely on raising more money by spreading the word of the prosperity gospel. 
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the expense of the poor.43 The preachers of the prosperity gospel emphasize 
that a person is rich and healthy because he or she is faithful to God and 
gives money to the televangelist church, and, likewise, a person is poor or 
ill because he or she is not faithful enough or does not contribute enough.44 
A. How the Prosperity Scheme “Preys” on Its Adherents 
The prosperity scheme is a spiritual movement in which televangelist 
pastors preach more than just making money; they encourage self-
empowerment through increased “participation” in the church.45 According 
to televangelist pastors, individuals can only become more successful when 
they realize that they are the reason for their poor financial situation or un-
happy life conditions.46 Prosperity preachers teach followers that they have 
the ability themselves—through faith and donations—to rise above any 
seemingly hopeless situation.47 For instance, one follower of the movement, 
Cindy Fleenor, stated that she donated hundreds of dollars to the movement 
because she “wanted to believe God wanted to do something great with 
[her] like he was doing with [the televangelists]”.48 Although Fleenor ini-
tially felt empowered, she eventually had to borrow money from friends and 
family in order to recoup her loses and pay her daily expenses, after her 
promised wealth never arrived.49 Fleenor’s reasons for donating capture the 
feelings of so many other prosperity followers.50 Fleenor’s experience is 
illustrative of the prosperity theology’s dangerous and costly cycle; by ap-
pealing to feelings of empowerment and self-responsibility, prosperity pas-
                                                                                                                           
See David Van Biema & Jeff Chu, Does God Want You to Be Rich?, TIME (Sept. 10, 2006), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1533448,00.html (noting that while pros-
perity preacher John Osteen gave $1 million in relief money after Hurricane Katrina, there were 
far more examples of prosperity preachers, including Osteen, using the prosperity doctrine for 
personal gain). 
 43 See ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 192–94. 
 44 See WALTON, supra note 20, at 95; SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 1. Kenneth 
Copeland has explained away apparent failures of his doctrine by asking rhetorically, to a laugh-
ing audience, “Could it be, by some stretch of the imagination—oh probably not—but could it be, 
that it’s your fault and not God’s? Oh yeah!” SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 1. 
 45 See BOWLER, supra note 7, at 232; WALTON, supra note 20, at 95. This “participation” 
includes financially contributing to the success and well-being of the televangelist church. See 
SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 1. 
 46 See BOWLER, supra note 7, at 232–33; WALTON, supra note 20, at 95. 
 47 See BOWLER, supra note 7, at 232; WALTON, supra note 20, at 95. 
 48 Gorski, supra note 7. Material wealth did not come to Fleenor, who had to ask for money 
from friends and take out payday loans in order to purchase her groceries. Id. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See BOWLER, supra note 7, at 232–33; HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 115–16; Gorski, supra 
note 7. 
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tors can keep their flocks donating money even when the divinely promised 
health and wealth do not arrive.51 
Donating financially to the televangelist church is not the only contri-
bution that is expected of prosperity parishioners; prosperity pastors also 
take advantage of their parishioners by convincing them to invest in fraudu-
lent secular schemes.52 Notably, in the 1980s, televangelist and prosperity 
preacher Jim Bakker sought donations from his followers to fund a Chris-
tian family retreat center by advertising the sale of lifetime timeshare-
partnerships through his television network.53 Interest in the timeshare-
partnerships was so strong that the donations Bakker received totaled more 
than $158 million.54 Despite strong sales from approximately 150,000 part-
nerships, only one hotel and one bunkhouse were constructed.55 Bakker 
used the rest of the donations to fund his extraordinarily lavish lifestyle, 
including the purchase of a forty-two foot houseboat, a mink coat, “gold-
plated fixtures and a $570 shower curtain in his bathroom, transportation in 
private jets and limousines, an air-conditioned treehouse for his children 
and an air conditioned doghouse for his pets.”56 
Televangelists preaching the prosperity gospel have employed other 
strategic techniques to exploit their followers for money, particularly by 
using common ethnic ties or by publicly praising or humiliating members.57 
For example, prosperity pastors have appealed to a kinship of race to foster 
a sense of trust with their parishioners, in the hopes that they will donate to 
the televangelist church.58 African American prosperity preacher Frederick 
Prince offered his reason for preaching: “I’m only doing it so that you can 
see that there’s somebody the same color that you are, breathing the same 
contaminated air, paying the same outrageous prices for everything else, 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See BOWLER, supra note 7, at 232–33; HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 115–16; SUFFER THE 
CHILDREN, supra note 1. 
 52 See United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 731–32 (4th Cir. 1991); BOWLER, supra note 7, 
at 142. 
 53 Bakker, 925 F.2d at 731. 
 54 Id. Many of the people who purchased partnerships in the retreat center could barely afford 
them. See id. 
 55 Id. Although the actual number of lodging spots in the center is not reported, it can be in-
ferred that 150,000 lodging spots would not fit in just one hotel. See id. 
 56 Id.; BOWLER, supra note 7, at 108. Bakker’s malfeasance in drastically overselling the 
timeshares caught up with him. See BOWLER, supra note 7, at 107–08. Other prosperity pastors, 
led by Bakker’s televangelist rival Jimmy Swaggert, discovered Bakker’s gross financial misman-
agement and accused him and their programs of having homosexual encounters. See id. In 1989, 
Bakker was sentenced to forty-five years imprisonment and fined $500,000 for mail fraud, wire 
fraud, and conspiracy for overselling timeshares. Bakker, 925 F.2d at 731–32. 
 57 See Last Week Tonight, supra note 7. 
 58 See BOWLER, supra note 7, at 134; Hanna Rosin, Did Christianity Cause the Crash?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 2009), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/12/did-christianity-
cause-the-crash/307764/[http://perma.cc/4KX2-PP78]. 
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and I’m prospering because of the book.”59 In addition, prosperity preachers 
often target specific members of their following, confronting them in front 
of the rest of the church for not donating enough money, in the hopes that 
others will be encouraged to donate more.60 A speaker at a Maryland pros-
perity church asked each of his followers who did not donate during a “pas-
tor’s appreciation month” to stand during the service and pledge at least 
$1000.61 Other prosperity pastors take the opposite approach, and instead 
choose to glorify those who donate.62 For example, pastor Marvin Winans 
of the Perfecting Church Detroit praised donors who had given more than 
$30 by only asking those members of the church to rise and take the tradi-
tional walk around the collection bucket.63 Parishioners who had not donat-
ed that specific amount were left seated for the entire congregation to ob-
serve their lack of participation in the church.64 Given the financial success 
of these prosperity preachers, it is apparent that these strategic and manipu-
lative tactics are very successful.65 
B. Believers of the Prosperity Scheme 
Bonnie Parker’s experience with the prosperity gospel exemplifies the 
unfortunate consequences of the prosperity scheme.66 Parker died after re-
fusing modern medical treatment for her illness, because she believed that 
donating to the prosperity ministry would result in good health and financial 
success.67 That widely held belief, coupled with the fervent satisfaction of 
donating to a Christian organization, enables televangelist pastors and their 
ministries to raise hundreds of millions of dollars with relative ease.68 Many 
low-income Americans perceive the prosperity gospel as a way to potential-
ly solve financial difficulties.69 Such difficulties, however, are only exacer-
bated by the repeated contributions that they realistically cannot afford.70 
Prosperity preachers encourage this perception by promising unrealistic 
benefits for grand monetary donations.71 For example, televangelist Mike 
                                                                                                                           
 59 BOWLER, supra note 7, at 134. 
 60 See id. at 130. 
 61 Id. One man stood up and said that he would give what he could afford, to which the 
speaker admonished the parishioner for his feebleness in his faith. Id. 
 62 See id. at 128–29. 
 63 Id. at 128. 
 64 See id. 
 65 See Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. 
 66 See id. 
 67 See id.; News 8 Reporting Featured in ‘Last Week Tonight’ Segment, supra note 1. 
 68 See HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 116; ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 192–93. 
 69 See HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 116. 
 70 See id. at 115; Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. 
 71 See Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. 
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Murdock once requested a $1000 donation to his ministry from each of his 
followers with the promise that God would wipe out each donor’s credit 
card indebtedness—a result that would never actually occur.72 In many re-
spects, donating to a prosperity church is comparable to buying lottery tick-
ets; donors are enticed by an expectation of a quick-fix to their financial 
problems, without realizing that the payoff is highly unlikely.73 
Although prosperity theology does not result in immense financial 
benefits for those to whom it is preached, it does for those who preach it.74 
The vast disparity between the wealth of the televangelist pastors and their 
faithful followers has raised questions as to where the donations are actually 
going.75 Although a lack of financial transparency has made it difficult to 
completely assess the financial status of the prosperity churches, multiple 
church pastors are estimated to be multi-millionaires.76 Compared to the 
estimated significant wealth of the church pastors, the communities in 
which these pastors preach are often impoverished.77 For instance, Creflo 
Dollar, a prosperity pastor of a mega-church in College Park, Georgia, had 
an estimated net worth of $27 million as of 2014.78 Despite Dollar’s per-
sonal success, however, the average annual income in College Park at that 
time was only $29,640.79  
                                                                                                                           
 72 See id. Comedian John Oliver satirized this proposition by stating that it was similar to 
claiming “the key to you losing weight lies at the bottom of this giant Costco bulk bag of peanut 
butter M&M’s”. Id. Another commentator has noted that a typical story about a person’s divine 
enrichment falls “somewhere between metaphor and a literal image of barefoot Jesus handing [a 
prosperity adherent] a pile of cash.” Rosin, supra note 58. Such nebulous promises escape critique 
by followers because adherents frequently attribute any achievement in wealth, regardless of actu-
al source, to God. See id. 
 73 See HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 115; SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 1. In fact, it has 
been alleged that pastors go so far as to send parishioners anonymous gifts of cash to give the 
appearance that their trust in the prosperity gospel is paying off. See BOWLER, supra note 7, at 
133. 
 74 See Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. 
 75 See BOWLER, supra note 7, at 233; ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 191–93. Although the pre-
cise wealth of various televangelists is not known, commentators have estimated that their minis-
tries’ operating budgets run in the tens of millions of dollars. See, e.g., BOWLER, supra note 7, at 
101 (noting that prosperity preacher Oral Roberts had an annual budget of $125 million in 1990); 
ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 192–93 (noting that prosperity preachers Joel Osteen and Creflo Dollar 
have prosperity ministries that have budgets of $60 million and $80 million, respectively). 
 76 See 8 Black Pastors Whose Net Worth Is 200 Times Greater Than Folks in Their Local Com-
munities, ATLANTA BLACK STAR (June 26, 2014), http://atlantablackstar.com/2014/06/26/8-black-
pastors-whose-net-worth-is-200-times-greater-than-folks-in-their-local-community [http://perma.
cc/H9EY-A4YG]; Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. 
 77 See 8 Black Pastors Whose Net Worth Is 200 Times Greater Than Folks in Their Local 
Communities, supra note 76. 
 78 See id. Dollar claims, “I own two Rolls-Royces and didn’t pay a dime for them. Why? 
Because while I’m pursuing the Lord those cars are pursuing me.” BOWLER, supra note 7, at 134. 
 79 8 Black Pastors Whose Net Worth Is 200 Times Greater Than Folks in Their Local Com-
munities, supra note 76. 
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This disparity is not a coincidence; scholars have noted that Americans 
with low income and less education are more likely to be adherents to pros-
perity theology than their wealthy, more educated counterparts.80 One study 
that compared Hispanic Christians from varying income levels found that a 
majority of Hispanic Christians whose annual income was less than $30,000 
agreed with the position, “God will grant wealth and good health to believ-
ers with enough faith,” whereas only a quarter of Hispanic Christians whose 
annual income was more than $75,000 held that same position.81 Limited 
financial resources are not the only indication that an individual will hold a 
belief in the prosperity gospel; individuals with a lower level of education 
are also more likely to adhere to the doctrine than those with a higher level 
of education.82 For instance, twenty-four percent of American adults with an 
eighth grade education, or less, agree with the statement “poverty is a sign 
that God is unhappy.”83 Amongst college graduates however, that number is 
only one percent.84 These statistics suggest that Americans with more edu-
cation are far less likely to accept the central tenants of the prosperity gos-
pel than those with a lower level of education.85 A lack of wealth and educa-
tion contributes to an individual’s belief in the prosperity gospel, and the 
willingness to take risks with health and financial resources in order to ob-
tain “prosperity” through the televangelist church.86 
                                                                                                                           
 80 BOWLER, supra note 7, at 233; PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE SHIFTING RELIGIOUS IDENTITY 
OF LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES 91 (Tracy Miller ed., 2014), http://www.pewforum.org/
2014/05/07/the-shifting-religious-identity-of-latinos-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/T7C8-
KXFD] (to access PDF, follow “Complete PDF Report” hyperlink); cf. Koch, supra note 18, at 25 
(arguing education is the correlating factor in prosperity gospel adherence but disclaiming in-
come’s effect on prosperity gospel adherence). 
 81 PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 80, at 91. Note that among all Hispanics in the United 
States, forty-nine percent agree with this position. Id. 
 82 Koch, supra note 18, at 25. 
 83 Id. at 21. About seventy percent of black Americans surveyed with an eighth grade educa-
tion or less believed that “poverty is a sign that God is unhappy.” Id. at 28. 
 84 Id. at 21. The percentage was again higher for blacks than the rest of Americans at approx-
imately ten percent for college graduates surveyed, however, the racial divide over this position 
narrows significantly as education increases. Id. at 28. 
 85 Id. at 25. 
 86 See ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 188; Koch, supra note 18, at 25. Black Americans are pro-
portionally the largest adherents to the prosperity doctrine. See Koch, supra note 18, at 21, 27. 
While approximately five percent of all Americans are members of the prosperity movement, 
sixteen percent of all black Americans are members of the movement. Id. Some scholars place less 
of an emphasis on the correlation between wealth and belief in the prosperity gospel. See BOW-
LER, supra note 7, at 233 (noting some prosperity preachers have in the past sought out those who 
are already financially prosperous but conceding that scholars view the “prosperity gospel as a 
poor people’s movement”). Others go so far as to claim that there is no relationship between one’s 
adherence to the prosperity gospel and one’s wealth. Koch, supra note 18, at 23–24. This position 
is refuted by several critics of the movement. BOWLER, supra note 7, at 233 (“Scholars often por-
tray the prosperity gospel as a poor people’s movement, an expression of believers’ longing for 
(and distance from) socio-economic stability.”); HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 115 (noting that the 
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II. AVOIDING REGULATION: HOW TELEVANGELISTS USE THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION AND TAX SYSTEM TO KEEP THEIR MONEY 
The deceptive tactics used by the prosperity preachers, if employed by 
non-religious organizations, would raise red flags for government regulators 
and prosecutors.87 As religious organizations, however, prosperity churches 
operate largely without government oversight and have no legal obligation 
to disclose their finances to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).88 These 
organizations benefit from governmental deference to religion under the 
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and certain loopholes in the tax 
code that conceal their finances from regulators.89 
A. The Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
The principle of freedom of religion is deeply rooted in the nation’s 
history.90 The First Amendment prevents the government from establishing 
a state religion under its Establishment Clause, and from restricting individ-
uals’ religious beliefs under its Free Exercise Clause.91 Despite the guaran-
tees of the First Amendment, religious freedom in the United States is far 
from absolute.92 In order to elucidate the level of First Amendment protec-
tion endowed upon religious ministers, including prosperity gospel preach-
ers, a truncated history of religious freedom in the United States is appro-
priate.93 Three significant Supreme Court cases, Reynolds v. United States, 
United States v. Ballard, and Employment Division Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, and a review of the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act (RFRA) of 1993 and its subsequent case law, shed crucial light 
on the limiting standards placed on the government when policing religious 
practices.94 
                                                                                                                           
poor are particularly drawn to the prosperity gospel because they “often believe that betting on 
God’s generosity is more likely to pay off than betting on, say, government lottery tickets”); ROB-
ERTS, supra note 8, at 188 (noting prosperity theology’s roots were in poor U.S. Evangelical 
communities and that the doctrine has since spread to poor Christians everywhere). 
 87 See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 846–47 (9th Cir. 1981); Last Week Tonight, 
supra note 4. 
 88 Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. 
 89 See O’BRIEN, supra note 33, at 798; John Montague, The Law and Financial Transparency 
in Churches: Reconsidering the Form 990 Exemption, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 203, 206–07 (2013). 
 90 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878); O’BRIEN, supra note 33, at 798. 
 91 U.S. CONST. amend. I; O’BRIEN, supra note 33, at 688. The Establishment Clause creates 
what is often referred to as the separation of church and state. O’BRIEN, supra note 33, at 688.  
 92 O’BRIEN, supra note 33, at 798. 
 93 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012), invali-
dated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); United States v. Ballard (Ballard 
II ) , 322 U.S. 78, 79–80 (1944);  Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. 
 94 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb; Ballard II, 322 U.S. at 79–80; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. Additional 
cases further explore the issue of religious freedom in the United States. See, e.g., Burwell v. 
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Decided in 1878, Reynolds was a landmark case in determining just 
how far protection under the Free Exercise Clause extended to individuals 
who had, for religious reasons, performed acts that were otherwise in viola-
tion of federal law.95 In the mid-1870s, George Reynolds was indicted and 
charged in the Third Judicial District of the Territory of Utah under a federal 
statute prohibiting bigamy.96 Reynolds, who had two wives, was a devout 
member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, which required 
polygamy; failure to marry multiple women, according to the church, was 
punishable by eternal damnation in hell.97 Reynolds argued that his beliefs 
were protected under the Free Exercise Clause, and that he was entitled to 
an exception to the statute because of his religious duty.98 The U.S. Su-
preme Court disagreed, and held that although laws could not constitution-
ally interfere with religious beliefs, they could interfere with religious prac-
tices.99 The Court reasoned that permitting the unrestrained free exercise of 
beliefs would allow for the unfettered creation of exceptions to criminal 
laws.100 The Court’s decision serves as a historical benchmark for the prop-
osition that although the content of religious beliefs cannot be regulated, 
                                                                                                                           
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2770 (2014) (holding that “person” within meaning of 
RFRA extends to for-profit and non-profit corporations); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Benefi-
cente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423 (2006) (holding Controlled Substances Act’s ban on 
hallucinogen found in sacramental tea did not meet burden required by RFRA); Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 538 (1993) (overturning municipal ban 
on animal sacrifice because it specifically targeted members of the Santeria faith). 
 95 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 146; O’BRIEN, supra note 33, at 800. 
 96 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 146. The statute in relevant part states: 
Every person having a husband or wife living, who marries another, whether mar-
ried or single, in a Territory, or other place over which the United States have exclu-
sive jurisdiction, is guilty of bigamy, and shall be punished by a fine of not more 
than $500, and by imprisonment for a term not more than five years. 
Id. (citations omitted). Bigamy is defined as “the crime of marrying while one has a spouse still liv-
ing, from whom no valid divorce has been effected.” Bigamy, DICTONARY.COM, http://www.
dictionary.com/browse/bigamy [https://perma.cc/WM6S-QENV]. Polygamy, a concept that can 
subsume bigamy, is defined as “the practice or condition of having more than one spouse, especially 
wife, at one time.” Polygamy, DICTONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/polygamy?s=t. 
 97 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161. The Mormon Church currently does not preach the practice of 
polygamy, which is now punishable by excommunication. Do Mormons Practice Polygamy?, 
MORMON.ORG WORLDWIDE, https://www.mormon.org/faq/practice-of-polygamy [http://perma.cc/
EE6Z-8JNQ]. 
 98 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161–62. The district court, however, convicted and sentenced him to a 
two-year term of hard labor. Id. at 150. 
 99 Id. at 167. The Supreme Court did not affirm the hard labor imposition of imprisonment 
because it was inconsistent with the portion of a congressional act regarding sentencing. Id. at 
168–69. 
 100 See id. at 167. In the Court’s words, such an exception would “permit every citizen to 
become a law unto himself.” Id. 
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conduct inspired by such beliefs is not necessarily free from legal regula-
tion.101 
Reynolds laid the foundation for the principle that religiously-inspired 
conduct could be regulated by the State; subsequent cases, however, tem-
pered the extent to which the government could regulate such conduct.102 
Ballard, decided in 1944, hindered the government’s ability to regulate reli-
gion.103 Ballard concerned the “I Am” movement, led by Edna and Donald 
Ballard.104 The pair, much like current televangelists, preached the doctrine 
of “faith healing” and solicited donations from the public to build their min-
istry.105 Given the allegedly deceitful donation scheme, they were charged 
with mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 338.106 At trial, the judge as-
signed to the case in the Southern District of California instructed the jury 
that “[t]he question of the defendants’ good faith is the cardinal question in 
this case. You are not to be concerned with the religious belief of the de-
                                                                                                                           
 101 See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990); Reyn-
olds, 98 U.S. at 166–67. As applied here, Reynolds was free to believe the failure to take on mul-
tiple wives would lead to eternal damnation under the teachings of his church, but he was not free 
to practice that belief by taking on multiple wives. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167. Freedom of belief is 
legally synonymous with freedom of thought. See United States v. Ballard (Ballard II ) , 322 U.S. 
78, 86 (1944). In an opinion written almost a century later, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin 
Scalia best surmised what is meant by the phrase “religious practices.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 877–78. 
According to Justice Scalia, these include, but are not limited to, “the performance of (or absten-
tion from) physical acts: assembling with others for a worship service, participating in sacramental 
use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transporta-
tion.” Id. 
 102 See O’BRIEN, supra note 33, at 803, 810. 
 103 See 322 U.S. at 87. 
 104 Id. at 79–80. The movement, an independent religion, was founded on Guy Ballard’s claim 
that he was the messenger of the supernatural “Master Saint Germain.” O’BRIEN, supra note 33, at 
800. Edna was Guy Ballard’s widow and Donald was their son. Id. Guy, who went by the aliases 
Saint Germain, Jesus, George Washington, and Godfre Ray King, believed that he had been se-
lected by a divine group of figures, the “ascertained masters,” to serve as a medium through which 
the “masters” could be in contact with mankind. Ballard II, 322 U.S. at 79–80. 
 105 Ballard II, 322 U.S. at 79–80. 
 106 Id. at 79. At the time the Ballards were charged, the statute stated: 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or 
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, represen-
tations, or promises . . . shall, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or 
attempting so to do, place, or cause to be placed, any letter, postal card, package, 
writing, circular, pamphlet, or advertisement, whether addressed to any person resid-
ing within or outside the United States, in any post office . . . of the United States 
. . . to be sent or delivered by the post-office establishment of the United States . . . 
or shall knowingly cause to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon 
. . . any such letter, postal card, package, writing, circular, pamphlet, or advertise-
ment, shall be fined not more than $1000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both. 
18 U.S.C. § 338 (1946) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012)). 
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fendants.”107 In other words, the judge urged the jury to focus not on wheth-
er the beliefs espoused by the “I Am” movement were true, but rather, on 
whether the Ballards sincerely believed in the movement, or were simply 
using it as an avenue to make money.108 Under this instruction, the jury 
found the Ballards guilty of mail fraud.109 
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that the va-
lidity of the “I Am” doctrine was not a triable issue of fact, and thus, was 
properly excluded from the jury trial instruction.110 The majority opinion 
expressed concern that if the truthfulness of religious beliefs were submitted 
to a jury, then any religious doctrine could be put on trial, which would vio-
late the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.111 The majority remained 
silent on whether or not the trial judge was correct in charging the jury to 
determine whether the Ballards sincerely believed in the “I Am” move-
ment.112 The Supreme Court in United States v. Seeger later concluded that 
although a judge may not charge the jury with finding whether or not a reli-
gious doctrine is true, a judge may charge the jury with finding whether or 
not a defendant believed in the religious doctrine.113 
                                                                                                                           
 107 Ballard II, 322 U.S. at 82. 
 108 See id. at 88. 
 109 Ballard v. United States (Ballard I ) , 138 F.2d 540, 541 (9th Cir. 1943), rev’d, Ballard II. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, ordering a new trial on 
the grounds that the truthfulness of the representations regarding the defendants’ religious beliefs 
should have been submitted to the jury. Ballard II, 322 U.S. at 83, 85–86. This would have been a 
significantly lower standard for the prosecution to convict, because, as noted by Justice Douglas, 
“[m]en may believe what they cannot prove.” Id. at 86–87. 
 110 Ballard II, 322 U.S. at 88. The “sincerity of belief” is shorthand for the principle that the 
Ballards actually had faith in the doctrine they taught as opposed to merely representing that they 
believed in the doctrine, solely in order to defraud followers who followed their teachings. See 
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965); Ballard II, 322 U.S. at 88. 
 111 Ballard II, 322 U.S. at 87. The Court noted that “no interference [of the free exercise of 
religion] can be permitted, provided always the laws of society, designed to secure its peace and 
prosperity, and the morals of its people, are not interfered with.” Id. (quoting Davis v. Beason, 133 
U.S. 333, 342 (1890), rev’d on other grounds, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1999)). 
 112 See id. at 88. Justice Jackson stated that it was impossible to sever “belief” into the truth of 
the belief and the sincerity of the believer. Id. at 92–93 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“How can the 
[g]overnment prove these persons knew something to be false which [the government] cannot 
prove to be false?”). 
 113 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185; Ballard II, 322 U.S. at 88. In Seeger, the Court heard the cases of 
various petitioners who had been convicted for failure to submit to induction in the armed forces. 
380 U.S. at 166–69. The men claimed they were “conscientious objector[s]” to the war. Id. at 
165–69 (conscientious objectors are those who are religiously opposed to war). Writing for a ma-
jority of eight justices, Justice Clark clarified Ballard II in the following way: “while the ‘truth’ of 
a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant question whether it is ‘truly held. 
This is the threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case. It is, of course, a 
question of fact . . . .” Id. at 185 (emphasis added). 
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Fifty years after Ballard, the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith clarified the 
limits of religious exemption from criminal statutes.114 The case involved 
two respondents, Alfred Smith and Galen Black, who were fired from their 
jobs at a private company in Oregon after taking a controlled substance, the 
hallucinogen known as peyote.115 As a result, the pair was denied unem-
ployment benefits by the Oregon employment division, and subsequently 
filed suit.116 In 1990, the case reached the Supreme Court, where Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the denial of Smith and Black’s 
unemployment benefits was lawful.117 The majority determined that reli-
gion-neutral laws, such as a prohibition on hallucinogens, do not require a 
compelling government justification to be upheld, even if those laws intrude 
upon one’s exercise of religion.118 The Court reasoned that it would be un-
constitutional to ban a physical act solely to prevent a particular religious 
practice, however, a blanket ban on actions irrespective of any religious ap-
plication would not be invalid on free exercise grounds.119 Smith serves as a 
tool for drawing a distinction between permissible secular regulations that 
affect religious practices, and prohibited anti-religious regulations.120 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
 115 Id. at 874. 
 116 Id. The pair appealed the determination of the employment division to the Oregon Court of 
Appeals. Id. The court reversed the decision of the employment division, holding that the denial of 
unemployment benefits violated Smith and Black’s right to the free exercise of religion. Id. The 
Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. 
at 875. 
 117 Id. at 872, 890. 
 118 Id. at 885. This is a judicial standard of review for laws referred to as strict scrutiny. See 
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the 
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800 (2006). In order for a law or regulation to survive 
strict scrutiny, the government must have a compelling objective for passing the regulation and the 
law must use narrowly tailored means of furthering that governmental interest. See id. Another test 
of constitutional review is rational basis review. See id. at 799. Most laws pass rational basis re-
view, which evaluates whether the law is a rational way of furthering a legitimate government 
interest. See id.; see also Jeremy V. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the 
Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications 
Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2772 (2005) (noting that “[t]he rational 
basis test in its traditional form is extremely deferential to any proffered governmental interest”). 
 119 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877–78. As a result, the Court concluded that denying Smith and 
Black unemployment compensation was constitutional. See id. at 890. 
 120 See id. at 877–78, 885. To illustrate the distinction, a law prohibiting male circumcision for 
the purpose of promoting male health would likely be constitutional under Smith. See id. The same 
law, drafted for the purpose of burdening the Jewish faith, would likely be found unconstitutional. 
See id.; The Circumcision Ceremony in a Nutshell, CHABAD.ORG http://www.chabad.org/library/
article_cdo/aid/1472861/jewish/The-Circumcision-Ceremony-in-a-Nutshell.htm [http://perma.cc/
D4BC-C79A] (noting importance of male circumcision in the Jewish faith). 
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Smith’s ruling left the sacred practices of many minority religions vul-
nerable to legal regulation.121 Congress, unhappy with what it perceived to 
be an infringement on the free exercise of religion, passed RFRA in re-
sponse.122 Under RFRA, Congress aimed to restore the requirement of a 
more rigorous justification for any governmental action that burdened reli-
gious exercise.123 In relevant part, RFRA states that the “[g]overnment may 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates 
that application of the burden to the person[] is in furtherance of a compel-
ling governmental interest[] and[] is the least restrictive means of furthering 
that compelling governmental interest.”124 In other words, RFRA changed 
the landscape that Reynolds, Seeger and Smith set forth by requiring secular 
regulations that affect religious practices to pass a strict scrutiny standard of 
review, which is often too high a burden to meet.125Although the Supreme 
Court has limited RFRA to apply only to the federal government and not the 
states, several states have signed similar bills into law.126 
In addition, state courts hearing cases regarding the fraudulent actions 
of prosperity preachers have chosen to independently interpret relevant Su-
                                                                                                                           
 121 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 908–09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Framers’ intent in 
drafting the Free Exercise Clause was to prevent prosecution resulting from intolerance of a minori-
ty’s practices); Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
17, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/17/us/clinton-signs-law-protecting-religious-practices.
html [https://perma.cc/YZM5-GT97]. This issue was brought to the fore in Montgomery v. County 
of Clinton, Michigan, 743 F. Supp. 1253, 1255 (W.D. Mich. 1990), when Joan Montgomery’s 
sixteen-year-old son was killed in an automobile accident following a police chase. Pursuant to 
Michigan law, an autopsy was performed to determine the cause of death. See id. at 1260. The 
State failed to inform the mother about the autopsy until after it had already happened. See id. at 
1255. She subsequently brought suit, arguing that she would not have consented to the autopsy on 
her son’s body because of her Jewish beliefs. See id. The court held that because the law authoriz-
ing the autopsy was religion neutral, the mother’s constitutional rights were not violated. See id. at 
1259–69. 
 122 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012), invali-
dated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Flores, 521 U.S. at 511–12. After 
a unanimous vote in the House of Representatives and a ninety-seven to three vote in the Senate, 
the bill was signed into law on November 16, 1993 by President Bill Clinton. Steinfels, supra note 
121.  
 123 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(3)–(4) (Congress found “in [Smith] the Supreme Court virtually 
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by 
laws neutral toward religion . . . .”). The discussion section of the Senate report on RFRA states, 
“we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objec-
tor, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.” S. REP. NO. 
103-111, at 6 (1993). The political rhetoric surrounding the passage of the bill was quite strong, 
with one state representative calling the Act a way to “remedy a decision[, Smith,] which posed 
great risk to the religious rights of all Americans.” 139 CONG. REC. H8713 (1993). 
 124 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). 
 125 Id.; see Winkler, supra note 118, at 800. 
 126 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014); Flores, 521 U.S. at 
511; Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. 
REV. 466, 466–67 (2010) (noting that sixteen states have bills similar to RFRA). 
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preme Court case law, which has created further obstacles for plaintiffs who 
bring civil actions against their prosperity preachers.127 Plaintiffs in the 
1996 case Tilton v. Marshall brought charges of fraud against prosperity 
preacher Robert Tilton, who made national news for dumping prayer re-
quests into the garbage after stripping the requests of cash.128 Tilton sought 
a writ of mandamus from the Texas Supreme Court to dismiss all claims 
against him, arguing that Ballard foreclosed consideration of his religious 
practices.129 The court reasoned that under Ballard, the misrepresentation of 
a religious doctrine would not constitute grounds for civil fraud, regardless 
of whether or not the actor held a sincere belief in the doctrine.130 As such, 
the court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims for fraud because the claims were 
related explicitly to the failure of the teachings of the prosperity gospel.131 
The court held that a jury could, however, consider whether Tilton had ful-
filled promises to read, touch, and pray over the plaintiffs’ prayer re-
quests.132 Failure to fulfill such promises could constitute actionable fraud 
because they were not based on a religious doctrine, but were based on con-
crete actions.133 
The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Reynolds, Ballard, Seeger, 
and Smith opened the door to government regulation of certain religious prac-
tices, including the regulation of the fraudulent practices of prosperity preach-
ers. 134 For example, under Smith, it would be permissible for a legislature to 
pass a law that requires any non-profit organization, including prosperity 
churches, to disclose annual tax returns, because such a law is a general ban on 
a secular action.135 Furthermore, under the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
                                                                                                                           
 127 Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. 1996). 
 128 Id.; BOWLER, supra note 7, at 137. The plaintiffs sought to recover both because Tilton 
promised acts such as touching and praying over the prayer requests and because they alleged 
Tilton did not truly believe in the prosperity message that he preached. Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 679. 
 129 Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 676. 
 130 Id. at 678. The Texas Supreme Court in Tilton arguably misconstrued U.S. Supreme Court 
case law. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940). The Supreme Court has been 
very vocal against a blanket religious immunity for churches, which Tilton essentially grants, 
because such immunity would also apply to pastors who did not even believe in the gospel they 
preached. See id. (“Nothing we have said is intended even remotely to imply that, under the cloak 
of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit frauds upon the public.”). Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court’s ruling in Seeger indicates that the Court would permit a lack of sincere belief in the 
religion preached as evidence of fraud. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965). 
 131 Tilton, 925 S.W. 2d at 678. The constitutional issue is the same for civil and criminal cas-
es. See id. (determining Supreme Court’s Ballard doctrine considered in a criminal appeal was 
applicable to a civil appeal). 
 132 Id. at 679. 
 133 See id. 
 134 See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–78 (1990); Unit-
ed States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965); United States v. Ballard (Ballard II ) , 322 U.S. 78, 
88 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168–69 (1878). 
 135 See 494 U.S. at 877–78. 
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Reynolds, Ballard, and Seeger, an investigation into prosperity preachers’ own 
beliefs in the prosperity doctrine, would be permissible.136 Federal and state 
government regulation of the fraudulent practices of prosperity preachers 
would not be without challenges.137 Under RFRA, any permissible federal 
government regulation of prosperity preachers’ practices would need to over-
come the often impossible hurdle of strict scrutiny.138 Similarly, civil actions 
against prosperity preachers at the state level would likely face obstacles over-
coming state court misinterpretations of Supreme Court case law, as evidenced 
in Tilton.139 
B. How Tax Law Allows Prosperity Preachers to Avoid Criminal 
Investigation and Civil Litigation 
Although the fundraising tactics employed by prosperity preachers are 
often dubious, and the destination of those funds appears to be the pastors’ 
pocketbooks, prosperity churches enjoy various tax loopholes that allow 
them to operate without government interference.140 Churches and other 
religious organizations in the United States have long enjoyed tax-free sta-
tus, meaning that they are not subject to federal corporate taxes.141 As 
“churches,” prosperity ministries are thus exempt from the responsibility of 
paying federal taxes each year.142 Under federal law, this tax-exempt status 
is predicated on the fact that the net earnings of religious organizations do 
                                                                                                                           
 136 See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 1. As evidenced by the Copelands’ own hypocri-
sies, particularly the fact that the family seeks medical treatment for their ailments despite their 
professed belief that faith healing can replace modern medicine, such an investigation could be 
quite damaging to the continuing success of the prosperity gospel. See Ballard II, 322 U.S. at 88. 
 137 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012), invali-
dated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Flores, 521 U.S. at 511–12. 
 138 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb; Flores, 521 U.S. at 511–12. 
 139 Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Tex. 1996); see Winkler, supra note 118, at 800. 
 140 See John Montague, supra note 89, at 206–07; Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. While this 
Note focuses on federal tax collection, many states also exempt religious organizations from filing 
tax returns. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.6033-2(g)(1)(i) (2015); 940 MASS. CODE REGS. § 2.02 (2016). 
 141 26 U.S.C. § 501(a), (c)(3) (2012); Wanda F. Reed, Note, Revenue Ruling 77-290—Recent 
Interpretations of Agency Law Inequitably Taxes Members of Religious Orders, 23 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 179, 179 (1988). 
 142 26 U.S.C. § 501(a), (c)(3); see Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. Organizations “op-
erat[ing] exclusively for religious . . . purposes” qualify for tax-exempt status. 26 U.S.C. § 501(a), 
(c)(3). It is remarkably easy for an organization to qualify as a church or religious organization for 
tax purposes. See Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. In order to satirize the IRS and various pros-
perity preachers, John Oliver created the Our Lady of Perpetual Exemption church and filed pa-
perwork with the IRS to establish his church. See id. Our Lady claimed the filming studio was its 
place of worship and that its weekly audience members were the parishioners. Id. Oliver pledged 
to donate all the “seed donations” Our Lady received to the non-profit organization Doctors With-
out Borders. Id. 
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not “inure” to an individual.143 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) literature 
provides several examples of prohibited inurement, including “the payment 
of dividends, the payment of unreasonable compensation to insiders and 
transferring property to insiders for less than fair market value.”144 The IRS 
claims that the prohibition against inurement to organizational insiders is 
dispositive of tax-exempt status.145 This means that, at least in theory, a 
prosperity church would lose its tax-exempt status if the pastors were truly 
being given unreasonable compensation.146 
Unfortunately, there is effectively no way of knowing where or to 
whom “seed donations” go after they are donated.147 Unlike other charitable 
organizations, the IRS exempts all churches, including prosperity churches, 
from filing tax return Form 990—a form specifically designed to keep track 
of the finances of tax-exempt organizations—thus precluding donors from 
knowing where precisely their money ends up.148 Moreover, the IRS rarely 
audits churches.149 There are approximately three hundred thousand Chris-
tian churches in the United States, yet in 2013 and 2014, the IRS only au-
                                                                                                                           
 143 26 U.S.C. § 501(a), (c)(3). Although there is quite a lot of latitude in the word “inure” as a 
term of art, “inure” colloquially means “to become of advantage.” Inure, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/inure [http://perma.cc/W23P-EJU4]; see also Darryll 
K. Jones, The Scintilla of Individual Profit: In Search of Private Inurement and Excess Benefit, 19 
VA. TAX REV. 575, 593–95 (2000) (providing a discussion on examples of what courts have con-
strued as inurement). The rule against inurement does not preclude an organization from paying 
reasonable amounts for services rendered, such as salaries to its employees. See INTERNAL REVE-
NUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, PUBLICATION 1828: 501(C)(3) TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES & 
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 5 (2015) [hereinafter TAX GUIDE]. 
 144 TAX GUIDE, supra note 143, at 5 (emphasis added). 
 145 Id. 
 146 See id. 
 147 See Montague, supra note 89, at 206–07. This is by no means a small exception. Id. at 206. 
Montague estimates that contributions to Christian churches in the United States were more than 
$34 billion in 2010. Id. 
 148 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(1),(3) (2012); Montague, supra note 89, at 206–07. Section 6033 in 
part states: 
Except as provided in paragraph (3), every organization exempt from taxation under 
section 501(a) shall file an annual return, stating specifically the items of gross in-
come, receipts, and disbursements, and such other information for the purpose of 
carrying out the internal revenue laws as the Secretary may by forms or regulations 
prescribe . . . . 
§ 6033(a)(1). Churches are listed as one of the exceptions to paragraph (a)(1): “Mandatory excep-
tions[:] . . . [(a)(1)] shall not apply to [] . . . churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions 
or associations of churches.” § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i). Note that while pastors must file tax returns, the 
potential for them underreporting their income is present because their employer, their church, 
need not annually report how much it pays them. See § 6033(a)(1), (3)(A)(i); United States v. 
Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471, 477 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 149 See, e.g., Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. 
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dited three churches.150 This is largely due to burdensome political and pro-
cedural hurdles.151 An audit can only happen if notice is given to the church 
and an “appropriate high-level Treasury official” believes that the church is 
in violation of its tax-exempt status.152 Legally, it is unclear who qualifies as 
an appropriate high-level Treasury official, and the lack of audits only fur-
ther confounds this issue.153 
The IRS is not the only governmental organization that has failed to 
prevent the abuses of the prosperity movement.154 In 2007, the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Finance (the “Committee”) gave six media-based prosperity 
ministries the option to provide the Committee with certain financial infor-
mation, including “expenses, compensation, and amenities given to execu-
tives.”155 Only two of the ministries cooperated and provided complete in-
formation to the chair of the Committee.156 After its review, the Committee 
recommended that self-regulation by the prosperity churches would be 
preferable to legislative action, and suggested that existing IRS rules pro-
hibiting churches from engaging in lobbying and campaigning be re-
pealed.157 The recommendation by the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance 
was surprising given its findings of managerial financial mismanagement by 
                                                                                                                           
 150 Fast Facts About American Religion, HARTFORD INST. FOR RELIGION RESEARCH (2006), 
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/research/fastfacts/fast_facts.html#growlose [http://perma.cc/Q338-AMBU]; 
Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. 
 151 See 26 U.S.C. § 7611(a)–(b) (2012); Peter J. Reilly, John Oliver Should Not Blame IRS for 
Televangelist Tax Abuse, FORBES (Aug. 23, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/
2015/08/23/john-oliver-should-not-blame-irs-for-televangelist-tax-abuse/#448f7ac7f12bba425f87f
12b [http://perma.cc/LJL2-Y9UV] (noting political hurdles to auditing churches). 
 152 See 26 U.S.C. § 7611(a)(2). The term “appropriate high-level Treasury official” is defined 
as: “the Secretary of the Treasury or any delegate of the Secretary whose rank is no lower than 
that of a principal Internal Revenue officer for an internal revenue region.” Id. § 7611(h). 
 153 See Elizabeth J. Kingsley, Religion, Politics, and Taxes—What Could Possibly Go 
Wrong?, 27 TAX’N EXEMPTS 42, 42–43 (2015). The position of principal internal revenue officer 
for an internal revenue region was abolished in 1998; however, the definition and statutory re-
quirement did not change, and there is great uncertainty over which extant officer qualifies to sign 
off on church audits. Id.; see also United States v. Living Word Christian Center, No. 08-MC-37, 
2009 WL 250049, at *3 (D. Minn. 2013) (holding the position of “Director of Exempt Organiza-
tions, Examination” did not qualify as an authorized “high-level Treasury official”). 
 154 See Goodstein, supra note 37; Grassley Seeks Information from Six Media-based Ministries, 
U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FIN. (Nov. 6, 2007), http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/
ranking/release/?id=baa4251a-ee70-48af-a324-79801cd07f18 [http://perma.cc/S3C9-QTFN]. 
 155 Grassley Seeks Information from Six Media-based Ministries, supra note 154. Senator 
Charles Grassley of Iowa investigated prosperity preachers Joyce Meyer, Benny Hinn, Kenneth 
Copeland, Paula White, Creflo Dollar, and Bishop Eddie Long. Goodstein, supra note 37. The 
inquiry began after various Evangelical Christians petitioned Senator Grassley over their concern 
that the six ministries appeared to be using donations for various luxury purchases, including air-
planes, jewelry, and expensive homes. Id. 
 156 Goodstein, supra note 37. 
 157 Id.  
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both churches.158 Rather than recommending more regulation to prevent fu-
ture mismanagement, the Committee recommended that churches be afford-
ed yet another tax exemption—one that effectively permits prosperity 
churches to solicit monetary endorsements.159  
Recognizing the legal loopholes offered by U.S. tax law, a cottage in-
dustry has formed to help pastors, including prosperity preachers, avoid 
government regulation by offering seminars that educate pastors on how to 
legally maximize their own wealth.160 Advertisements for these seminars 
claim to teach the mechanics of church tax law, including instructions on 
how to set up funds that pay pastors and avoid IRS scrutiny.161 These semi-
nars also offer advice on how churches can avoid being audited by the 
IRS.162 Although considered non-profit for tax purposes, prosperity church-
es have utilized the liberties afforded to them under the tax code to effec-
tively run a successful for-profit scheme.163 
III. HOW CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS AND CIVIL LITIGATION COULD  
BRING AN END TO THE ABUSES OF THE PROSPERITY GOSPEL 
 A lack of government oversight and financial transparency has al-
lowed prosperity preachers to swindle millions of dollars from their vulner-
ably faithful adherents without consequence.164 Although the government 
has legal precedent to prosecute the fraudulent conduct of the prosperity 
ministries, it rarely does given the difficulty in successfully prosecuting re-
ligious organizations.165 Furthermore, history demonstrates that a govern-
ment inquiry into the finances of prosperity preachers would be unpopular 
amongst religious leaders and political figures, and as such, prosperity 
                                                                                                                           
 158 See id. For example, many ministries gave minister housing allowances to friends and 
family members. See id. 
 159 See id. 
 160 See BOWLER, supra note 7. One such seminar is titled “How to Setup a Love Offering 
Program LEGALLY.” Id. 
 161 CHURCH MGMT. & TAX CONFERENCE, IT’S OFFICIAL . . . IT’S SERIOUS . . . THE IRS IS 
TRACKING CHURCHES BY A SPECIAL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER! (2016), http://www.cmtc.org/c/
TaxLawConference.pdf [http://perma.cc/9BUA-93MA].  
 162 See id. Their brochures highlight pastors who have been indicted or convicted for tax fraud. 
Id. Advertisements dubiously declare that “[a]ccording to the American Bar Association’s own statis-
tics, if you’re an average Pastor you have a 37% chance of having a legal problem in the next 12 
months.” Id. However, of more than three hundred thousand churches in the United States, only three 
were audited in 2013 and 2014, far below a rate of the thirty-seven percent claimed by this adver-
tisement. See id.; Fast Facts About American Religion, supra note 150; Last Week Tonight, supra 
note 4. 
 163 See Last Week Tonight, supra note 4. 
 164 See id. 
 165 See 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(1), (3) (2012); United States v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471, 477 (4th 
Cir. 2012); United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 47 (9th Cir. 1981); Tilton v. Marshall, 925 
S.W.2d 672, 680 (Tex. 1996); BOWLER, supra note 7, 101, 136–38. 
170 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 37:147 
preachers continue to exploit the tax-exempt status their “churches” have 
been awarded.166 To remedy these abuses, this Note proposes that criminal 
investigations for fraud and tax evasion, as well as civil lawsuits for fraud, 
be employed by the government and private citizens, respectively, to curtail 
the power of prosperity preachers.167 
A. Securing Criminal and Civil Convictions for Fraud  
Against Prosperity Preachers 
 The defense in United States v. Ballard is a burdensome challenge for a 
plaintiff or the government to overcome when bringing charges of fraud 
against a prosperity preacher if those charges relate solely to the preacher’s 
religious doctrine.168 In order to succeed in both criminal and civil cases for 
fraud, a prosecutor or a plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the pros-
perity preacher did not sincerely believe in the prosperity gospel; merely 
challenging the validity of the gospel would be insufficient and impermissi-
ble.169 In United States v. Rasheed, the United States successfully obtained 
an indictment against Reverend Hakeem Rasheed for mail fraud by provid-
ing damning evidence that Reverend Rasheed did not sincerely believe in 
the gospel he preached.170 The pastor’s eponymous Church of Hakeem 
preached a belief based on his interpretation of Christian scripture called 
“The God Within You,” which taught that if an individual gave money to 
the Church, he or she would be blessed with financial returns greater than 
the original gift.171 There was no divine intervention at play; Hakeem simp-
ly used new donations to pay older donors.172 The Ninth Circuit held that 
although Ballard foreclosed consideration as to whether Hakeem’s religious 
beliefs were valid, it still allowed inquiry into whether or not his beliefs 
were sincere.173 In order to provide retribution to the vulnerably faithful 
                                                                                                                           
 166 See Van Biema, supra note 29. 
 167 See Jinwright, 683 F.3d at 477; Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 847; Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 680. 
 168 See United States v. Ballard (Ballard II ) ,  322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (holding trier of fact 
may not consider validity of a defendant’s religious belief); Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 678. 
 169 See Ballard II, 322 U.S. at 88; Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 847. 
 170 663 F.2d at 847–48. 
 171 Id. 845. 
 172 Id. at 845, 847. As a defense, Rasheed argued that the “Dare to be Rich” program was a 
religious tenant of his organization and was protected by his Free Exercise rights under Ballard. 
Id. at 847. 
 173 Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 847. In other words, the Ninth Circuit allowed the factual inquiry of 
whether Rasheed actually believed in what he preached. See id. The court also noted that several 
factors showed the fraudulent nature of the operation. Id. at 848. Rasheed had instructed other 
ministers in his church to not use words like “promise,” “guarantee,” “investment,” or “security.” 
Id. Rasheed also told ministers that the return on investment was coming from foreign investments 
in gold, diamonds, and oil, of which there were none. Id. Finally, Rasheed never mentioned that 
there was doubt, chance, or faith connected with the organization. Id. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit 
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followers of the prosperity gospel, under Rasheed’s guidance, federal pros-
ecutors and private individuals should bring charges of criminal and civil 
fraud, respectively, against prosperity preachers, focusing on evidence that 
the prosperity preachers do not hold sincere beliefs in the prosperity gos-
pel.174  
In order to successfully indict a prosperity preacher for criminal mail 
fraud, federal prosecutors would need to establish that the prosperity 
preacher (i) used the mail (ii) with a specific intent to defraud.175 Individu-
als can recover in a civil case for mail fraud if they prove the same two el-
ements required in the criminal case.176 In a federal case, the first element is 
easily satisfied, as prosperity gospel preachers often use the mail in order to 
solicit and receive monetary donations from their parishioners.177 In order 
to prove that a prosperity preacher had a specific intent to defraud, a prose-
cutor or private citizen would need to demonstrate that the prosperity 
preacher did not have a sincere religious belief in the prosperity gospel.178  
Evidence of a specific intent to defraud, even if circumstantial, could 
take many forms.179 Prosecutors and private citizens could seek to subpoena 
a prosperity preacher’s tithing records—records of church donations repre-
senting one-tenth of the preacher’s income—to demonstrate that the preach-
er was not personally donating to the church as he or she was requesting his 
                                                                                                                           
concluded that Rasheed lacked sincere religious belief in the movement and upheld his conviction 
for mail fraud. See id. at 847–48, 855. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Phillips v. United 
States, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982) (Phillips was a co-defendant to Rasheed’s fraud case and was in-
volved in his organization; only Phillips appealed). 
 174 See 663 F.2d at 847–48. Various other statutes criminalize certain types of fraud over 
which the federal government may exercise jurisdiction. See, e.g., 18. U.S.C § 1341 (2012) (crim-
inalizing mail fraud). 
 175 See 18. U.S.C § 1341; Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 847 (requiring intent to defraud in mail fraud 
conviction case). 
 176 See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639, 647 (2008). This Note evalu-
ates the actions of prosperity preachers through the lens of mail fraud because mail fraud can lead 
to both civil and criminal liability. See id. Other various statutes protecting against fraud exist. 
E.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3802(a)(1)(A) (2012) (providing “any person who makes, presents, or submits 
. . . a claim that the person knows or has reason to know is false, fictitious, or fraudulent . . . shall 
be subject to . . . a civil penalty of not more than $5,000 for each such claim”). The analysis of 
such claims turns largely on intent to defraud. See Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 847. 
 177 See, e.g., Gerrit V. Betz, Note, Megachurches and Private Inurement: Are Some Faiths 
Taxable?, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 733, 753–54 (2010) (noting that the Copeland Ministries’ dona-
tion letter states on the envelope, “I am sowing $____ and believing for a hundredfold return”). 
 178 See Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 847–78. 
 179 Id. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict a person for fraud. Id. at 848; see also Cir-
cumstantial Evidence, FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/circumstantial+
evidence [https://perma.cc/N8XG-LG7K] (defining circumstantial evidence as “[i]nformation and 
testimony presented by a party in a civil or criminal action that permit conclusions that indirectly 
establish the existence or nonexistence of a fact or event that the party seeks to prove”). 
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or her parishioners to do.180 Demonstrating an inconsistency in, or complete 
lack of, personal donations to the prosperity church from a prosperity 
preacher would serve as a clear red flag to the jury that the pastor did not 
sincerely believe that devout dedication and contribution to the prosperity 
church would result in great financial success, despite such proclamation 
being central to the prosperity gospel.181  
A prosecutor or private citizen could also demonstrate that a prosperity 
preacher’s own personal behavior contradicts the gospel he or she preach-
es.182 For example, to successfully bring charges against the Copelands, a 
prosecutor or private citizen would demonstrate that although the 
Copelands advocate that people rely on religious programming rather than 
medical treatment to cure illnesses, they themselves seek doctors to treat 
their ailments.183 A jury could infer this hypocrisy to indicate that the 
Copelands do not truly believe in faith healing, which is the central tenant 
of the prosperity gospel.184 Demonstrating that prosperity preachers lack 
sincere belief in their own doctrine is evidence of specific intent to defraud; 
this is a criminal violation of the law for which televangelist prosperity pas-
tors should be held accountable.185 Furthermore, inquiries into religion tend 
to draw significant press coverage.186 Even if a prosperity preacher would 
not be found guilty for fraud in a court of law, exposing the scam may cause 
supporters to lose confidence in the prosperity gospel.187 By uncovering 
evidence that prosperity preachers lack sincere belief in their message, law-
suits would help prove to adherents that it is not the case that prosperity 
preachers are wealthy because they are faithful; rather, prosperity preachers 
are wealthy because they are scamming their adherents.188  
                                                                                                                           
 180 See Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 847–48; Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tex. 1996); 
Tithe, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tithe [http://perma.cc/
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B. Tax Laws Should Be Enforced and Expanded to Include Churches 
Another way to successfully prosecute prosperity preachers is to 
charge them with tax evasion.189 Typically, a new non-profit organization is 
required to fill out a financial disclosure form—IRS Form 1023—in order 
to request tax-exempt status.190 This form is reviewed by the IRS, which in 
turn grants or denies the organization’s tax-exempt status request.191 Under 
the Internal Revenue Code however, churches and other religious organiza-
tions are exempt from this requirement.192 A new church’s failure to submit 
IRS Form 1023 does not strip it of its tax-exempt status.193 Because church-
es, including prosperity churches, are not required to file yearly tax returns, 
they effectively enjoy audit-free status; there is no review of their non-profit 
status at their formation, nor is there a review of their non-profit status dur-
ing their operation.194 
Despite this exemption, the IRS encourages new churches to submit 
Form 1023 in order to “self-designate” their tax-exempt status.195 Some 
prosperity churches that heeded the advice of the IRS and filled out Form 
1023 were subsequently investigated for tax fraud, indicating that such fil-
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ings demonstrate the fraudulent practices of televangelist churches.196 For 
example, Anthony Jinwright, a prosperity preacher in North Carolina, was 
investigated for tax fraud after the IRS noted a discrepancy between the 
compensation reported on his personal tax return and the compensation re-
ported on his church’s Form 1023.197 The subsequent investigation revealed 
that Jinwright had understated his personal taxable income by more than $2 
million.198 Jinwright was indicted and convicted on charges of conspiracy to 
defraud the United States, tax evasion, aiding and abetting tax evasion, and 
filing false tax returns.199 Like Jinwright, the IRS could investigate other 
prosperity preachers—all of whom, as church employees, are not exempt 
from filing personal tax returns—by comparing their personal tax returns 
with their church’s Form 1023.200  
Unfortunately, under current tax law, audits of prosperity preachers’ fi-
nances would be limited to churches that have filed Form 1023.201 There-
fore, Congress should amend the Internal Revenue Code to require all 
churches file both Form 1023 and annual tax returns.202 Repealing the ex-
emptions churches currently receive would allow more transparency into 
whether prosperity churches actually have a legal right to tax-exempt sta-
tus.203 Legislatively, this would require Congress to remove the exceptions 
awarded to churches under 26 U.S.C. § 508(c)(1)—which exempts churches 
from filing Form 1023—and § 6033(a)(3)—which exempts churches from 
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filing annual returns.204 If Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code, 
the IRS would be able to investigate whether prosperity preachers were re-
ceiving inurement from their churches in violation of tax law.205 In the past, 
the IRS has revoked various churches’ tax-exempt status on grounds that the 
revenue was inuring to a preacher or other church official, rather than to the 
church.206 Requiring prosperity churches to disclose their financial records 
would allow adherents to learn what their donations actually fund.207 
Politically, however, an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code is 
not that likely.208 Approximately ninety percent of congressional members 
and about three-quarters of their constituencies are Christian.209 Because of 
these religious ties, Congress is not motivated to, and would most likely be 
unable to, garner enough support to reform the tax code, because such re-
form would affect all churches, not just prosperity churches.210 Fortunately, 
even without an amendment to the tax code, the government and private 
citizens still have the opportunity to hold televangelist prosperity preachers 
accountable for their practices.211 
CONCLUSION 
The Free Exercise Clause, its case law, and the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993 have allowed numerous religions to flour-
ish in the United States; however, they have also enabled prosperity preach-
ers to exploit millions of faithful victims without recourse. These preachers 
accentuate their wealth as proof that their theology works, and collectively 
command vast financial assets from their often poor and uneducated fol-
lowers. The fraudulent nature and massive size of the prosperity scheme 
evidently needs to be remedied. Strong political pressure against laws unfa-
vorable to religion suggests that such changes are not likely to come from 
Congress. Under current laws, the government should still take action 
through its investigative agencies by bringing criminal actions for fraud and 
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tax evasion against these pastors. If the government fails its electorate in 
taking these steps, parishioners should still bring civil suits against those 
who swindle them. Such a revolt may be the best solution of all. If the gov-
ernment were to indict prosperity pastors, those pastors would be champi-
oned as martyrs to their followers. If, however, the followers were to sue 
their prosperity pastors, then the pastors would begin to lose their wealth 
and influence, which is ultimately dependent on the inflow of cash from 
their parishioners. 
